The balanced scorecard has been hailed as one of the major developments in management accounting in the past decade. Lipe and Salterio (2000) show that one of the key scorecard features, the inclusion of measures that are unique to the strategic objectives of a business unit, tend to be ignored by managers when making performance evaluation judgments. This study employs an adapted version of Kennedy's (1993 Kennedy's ( , 1995 debiasing framework to motivate two approaches to reducing this "common measures bias." We examine whether increasing effort via invoking process accountability (i.e., requiring managers to justify to their superior their performance evaluations) and/or improving the perceived quality of the balanced scorecard measures (i.e., via assurance over the reliability and relevance of the performance measures) leads to managers' increased usage of unique performance measures in their evaluations. Results suggest that either the requirement to justify an evaluation to a superior or the provision of an assurance report over all measures increases the use of unique measures in managerial performance evaluation judgments. Interestingly, the combination of the two approaches is not as powerful as the individual debiasers by themselves. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the common measures bias is not an easily correctable cognitive illusion that disappears when the potential for judgment inconsistency is pointed out to participants. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
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The Balanced Scorecard:
The Effects of Assurance and Process Accountability on Managerial Judgment
I. INTRODUCTION
The balanced scorecard (BSC) is a performance measurement tool used to translate an organization's overall strategic goals into financial and non-financial objectives and performance measures (Kaplan and Norton 2001) . In diversified organizations, individual business units often face different competitive pressures, operate in different product markets, and therefore require different divisional strategies (Kaplan and Norton 1993) . One of the most innovative characteristics of the BSC as a management tool is that business units are encouraged to design customized scorecards to fit their unique situations within the context of an overall organizational strategy (e.g. growth, cost leadership, product innovation, etc.) (Kaplan and Norton 2001) . As a consequence, the BSC allows business unit managers to identify and set targets for the business unit's own unique set of performance measures. Although business units within a company may have several BSC measures in common, the unique measures should represent what individual business units must accomplish in order to succeed (Kaplan and Norton 1996a) . Kaplan and Norton (2001) provide several descriptive examples of organizations that have, according to anecdotal evidence, successfully implemented customized divisional scorecards. Lipe and Salterio (2000) (hereafter LS 2000) , however, find divisional performance evaluations reflect information contained in the measures that are common across divisions, essentially ignoring the information contained by the unique performance measures. LS (2000) attribute their results to the common measures bias (Slovic and MacPhillamy 1974) . Prior research (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; McNamara and Fisch 1964) cautions that if measures are not used in post-hoc performance evaluations, it is unlikely the measures will be attended to in ex ante decision-making. Thus, LS (2000) argue that if the unique measures are not attended to in ex ante decision-making, a key claimed benefit of the BSC is lost: the strategic focusing of managerial attention on the unique drivers of divisional success.
Furthermore, the LS (2000) finding is not an isolated experimental result as the common measures bias has been replicated using different types of BSC tasks (e.g., manipulating strategic relevance of measures, providing multi-period exposure to the BSC) and participants (including accounting and MIS undergraduates and corporate executives) (Banker, Chang and Pizzini 2001; Dilla and Steinbart 2002; Krumwiede, Swain and Eggett 2002) . This paper employs a theoretical framework to determine ways to enhance managers' ability to utilize the unique BSC measures in performance evaluation. From the perspective of normative practice, we assume that managers can determine if it matters whether or not they and/or their subordinates are using all the information in the BSC during performance evaluations. If practicing managers are satisfied with evaluations based solely on common measures, then our framework and results will not interest them. Feltham and Xie (1994) , however, demonstrate that additional performance measures have incremental value if they can be used to induce actions that are more congruent with shareholder value. If performance evaluations provide feedback to divisional managers that encourage them to pursue strategically congruent actions and if the scorecard has been designed to fulfill the norms that all measures are strategically relevant (e.g., Kaplan and Norton 1996a prescriptions) , then it seems reasonable to argue that both the common and unique performance measures should be considered in making performance evaluation judgments. Although we employ the terms "bias" and "bias reduction" in the remainder of the paper, we take no normative position on whether reducing the common measures bias is normatively appropriate as we know of no economic theory that would directly predict this. However, the position of BSC proponents such as Kaplan and Norton (1992 , 1993 , 1996a , 1996b , 2001 appears to be that both the common and the unique performance measures should be used in making managerial decisions, including performance evaluations.
Based on our framework, we examine two potentially effective bias-reducing approaches: (1) motivating managers to process the BSC information more deeply, and (2) providing managers with assurance that the BSC measures are relevant and reliable.
Our framework is adapted from prior research (Kennedy 1993 (Kennedy , 1995 that suggests each approach may reduce decision biases when decision maker capacity is available. The Kennedy (1993) framework suggests decision biases in an accounting setting can be effort-related (i.e., the decision maker is not motivated to use potentially harder to process information) or external data-related (i.e., the decision maker has concerns about the relevance and/or reliability of the information). 1 We adapt the Kennedy framework by considering whether either of the suggested bias-reducing approaches can increase, as 1 Kennedy also discusses internal data-related bias due to lack of knowledge/expertise. We attempt to control for this additional explanation by considering a variety of experience-related factors as potential control variables. Given the difficulty of determining who does or does not have knowledge/experience/ expertise in BSC-based performance evaluation (see LS 2000, 295-296 for a discussion of this issue), we decided to focus on effort and external data-related debiasing approaches.
opposed to normatively improving, the amount of information used in the performance evaluation judgment.
To address the potential for effort-related bias, we examine the effects of imposing process accountability by requiring managers to justify their performance evaluations to their superiors, a bias-reducing approach that can occur naturally in organizations. 2 To address the potential for external data-related bias, we examine the effects of providing a third-party assurance report regarding the relevance and reliability of all the BSC measures on managers' use of these measures in evaluating performance.
This study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, we examine ways of changing managers' use of the BSC in evaluating performance by incorporating both common and unique performance measures into their evaluations. Second, we examine external data-related debiasing efforts in addition to effort-related and internal data-related debiasing efforts that have been the focus of previous accounting research (Kennedy 1993 (Kennedy , 1995 . Third, as part of our examination of external data-related debiasing, we investigate the effects of providing an assurance report about business performance measures on managers' use of BSC performance measures. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants have recently launched the first product in a series designed to have more CPA/CA involvement with non-traditional performance measures. 3 The AICPA/CICA is approaching non-traditional performance measures first from the implementation perspective and once CPA/CA credentials are established in this practice area, then specific standards may be issued later as a means for CPA/CA's to provide assurance over these measurement systems. 4 Maines et al. (2002) comment "whether attestation services or other forms of reliability enhancement could affect the quality of nonfinancial measure reporting remains largely unexplored" (359). Therefore, by developing the form and content of the assurance report in cooperation with experts from the CICA, we provide insights about the impact of this potential assurance service provision in an important, and relatively unexplored, measurement role.
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Results indicate that our adaptation of Kennedy's (1993 Kennedy's ( , 1995 framework identifies two approaches that contribute to increased usage of unique performance measures in performance evaluation. We find that the provision of an assurance report on the relevance and reliability of the BSC (external data-related), as well as invoking process accountability (effort-related) via the requirement to justify to a superior the performance evaluations, increases the use of unique measures in performance evaluations. This would be considered an appropriate use of information by BSC proponents. Through additional experimentation we find that the assurance report effect is due to assurance over the reliability of the measures. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the common measures bias is not an example of a cognitive illusion (Tan, 4 Section 5025 of the CICA Handbook, SSAE No. 10 in the US and International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ASA) ISA 10 all outline assurance standards for all types of assurance engagements broadening previous standards that applied to assurance on financial statements only. 5 This approach is consistent with calls in accounting research to provide ex ante evidence about the benefits and costs of potential new standards (e.g., Libby and Kinney 2000; Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson 2002) . Libby and Hunton 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1996) and therefore, cannot be easily eliminated by drawing the manager's attention to the possible judgment inconsistency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first we introduce our adapted debiasing framework, relate the framework to the common measures bias and based on that analysis, hypothesize about approaches to reduce the bias. Next we describe the experiment and the results. We conclude with a discussion of our results and limitations of our approach. Kennedy (1993 Kennedy ( , 1995 proposes a framework for debiasing that focuses on the source of judgment bias. The emphasis of the Kennedy framework is improving judgment that is normatively in error. We adapt the Kennedy framework in one important respect; we use it to analyze factors that can lead to changes in judgment (i.e., incorporation of the unique measures information in managerial performance evaluations), while leaving it to practicing managers to determine whether this is a desirable, or quality-improving, outcome. However, we note that incorporating both common and unique measures in making managerial judgments is consistent with stated norms of Norton's (1996, 2001 ) BSC framework. As discussed below, in all other material respects we follow the Kennedy framework.
II. THE DEBIASING FRAMEWORK
Consistent with the Kennedy framework, we conceptualize effort to have two components: capacity and motivation. Our framework follows Kennedy's assumption that capacity is sufficient or can be increased if necessary and hence focuses on motivation and data. 6 One way of changing judgment may be to increase effort via the provision of incentives such as justification in an accountability relationship (SiegelJacobs and Yates 1996; Kennedy 1995; Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Simonson and Nye 1992) . 7 A number of studies have shown that increased accountability improves or changes task performance (e.g., Cloyd 1997; Tan and Kao 1999; Tetlock and Boettger 1989) . However, changes in judgments due to incentives such as accountability assume a contingent relationship between effort and the cognitive processes that change the judgment. That is, judgment changes only if effort increases and the cognitive processes are sensitive to increased effort (Libby and Lipe 1992) .
Our adapted framework, again consistent with Kennedy, suggests that people would be less responsive to data if the data are perceived to be of poor quality (i.e., perceived low relevance and reliability). Kennedy (1993 Kennedy ( , 1995 distinguishes between the external data available in the environment and internal data representations of the decision maker and we maintain that distinction. Kennedy suggests that external data is poor when it is perceived to be incomplete, obscured by what is viewed as irrelevant data, or presented in a form that undermines its usefulness. Kennedy proposes several remedies for poor external data including: searching for more data, elaborating, clarifying and restating existing data, or eliminating the perceived irrelevant data. Internal data is 6 The Kennedy (1993 Kennedy ( ,1995 framework can be viewed as a context-specific adaptation of the results of several studies in the psychology literature considering the consequences for decision making when different processes compete for limited cognitive resources (Arkes 1991; Fischhoff 1982; Norman and Bobrow 1975; Tetlock 1985) . 7 The provision of monetary incentives for accurate performance is another effort-inducing approach (Sprinkle 2000) . However, difficulties in evaluating participants' task performance on a timely basis as well as other operational and administrative problems made it impossible to use a performance contingent incentive in our experiment. Hence, we employ process accountability, which is likely to be a weaker approach to inducing effort. This weaker approach, of course, biases against our finding any effort-related increase in the use of unique performance measures.
defined by Kennedy (1995) as the decision maker's knowledge stored in memory while external data refers to information or signals from the environment. Kennedy suggests that internal data remedies include: refreshing the decision maker's memory, retraining, providing decision aids, and replacing the decision maker with someone who is more knowledgeable.
III. THE FRAMEWORK AND THE COMMON MEASURES BIAS
Our adapted framework is employed to seek approaches for increasing managerial usage of unique performance measures reported as being ignored in LS (2000) . The success of the approach depends on whether the apparent lack of use of the unique measures is effort-related, data-related, or both. If ignoring the unique measures is not effort-related, it could be either external or internal data-related. One solution to the external data problem would be to use only performance measures common to each division, but that would undermine the role of the BSC in emphasizing the unique drivers of divisional performance Norton 1996, 2001 ). Due to the great difficulties in determining who a BSC evaluation expert is and lack of consensus on how to train them (LS 2000, 295-296), we decided not to approach debiasing from an internal data remedy perspective. While we do not address the internal data approach directly in this study, we control for potential differences in internal data processing ability across participants based on their various types of reported work experience (e.g., accounting
and finance work experience) and academic background. (2000) discuss, determining the nature of experience and/or knowledge required to interpret the BSC is fraught with difficulty. Thus, measuring a variety of experience measures across a broad crosssection of full-time and part time MBAs at many different universities, most of whom had been introduced Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) identified the common measures bias through a series of experiments in which participants were given information about a student (e.g., need for achievement, English skills and quantitative skills) and then were asked to predict the first year university GPA of that student. 9 Each subject received one of the three items of information in common and one piece of information that was unique about each student. Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) find that judgments are based on the common information and that less weight is accorded to the unique information. It is interesting to note that Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) did not find their participants ignored the unique measures (unlike LS (2000) participants), but gave them substantially less weight. Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) attempted to debias their participants' judgments by providing both "correct answer" feedback with the distribution of correct answers (i.e., outcome feedback), educating them about the nature of the underlying distributions, and providing monetary incentives for higher prediction accuracy. In terms of our adapted framework, providing the correct answers/underlying distributions would be considered a modification of participants' internal data representation whereas the use of monetary incentives would be considered an effort-increasing manipulation. Slovic and MacPhillamy's combined debiasing attempts did not result in a reduction in the common to the BSC to some extent, was a design choice. We leave it to other researchers to determine if further work in this area might be fruitful based on the experience controls used in this study. 9 Later psychology research suggests the common measures bias is a special case of the structural alignment decision-making theory (e.g., Markman and Medin 1995; Zhang and Markman 1998) . Structural alignment theory is one of the few decision theories that is based on a memory and knowledge model instead of just the documentation of empirical regularities (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974) .
Common measures bias background
measures bias. Hence, basic psychology research does not provide any clear approaches to dealing with the common measures bias reduction. Markman and Medin (1995) suggest that given sufficient cognitive effort, decision makers can establish commonality across dimensions that on the surface are not common. Consistent with this claim, Kurtz, Miao and Gentner (2001) find that participants who engage in a more effortful comparison process are better able to detect the similarities and relations between two analogous scenarios. Further, Zhang and
Effort-related debiasing approach
Markman (2001) find that greater task involvement (motivation) leads to greater use of unique information in preference formation. Hence, these findings imply that managers' usage of both common and unique measures requires more cognitive effort than evaluations made employing only the common measures.
One way to invoke more effortful and complete processing of available information is to establish process accountability whereby individuals are informed they will need to justify their decision process before they have made a final decision or judgment (Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Simonson and Staw 1992) . Numerous studies provide evidence supporting the effort-inducing effects of process accountability (e.g., Mero and Motowidlo (1995) , Kennedy (1995) and Tan and Kao (1999) ). Furthermore, in a direct test of the effects of process accountability on the amount of information considered, Siegel-Jacobs and Yates (1996) show that process accountability leads to increased usage of all available information.
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Hence, if the common measures bias documented by LS (2000) is due to lack of effort, prior research suggests invoking process accountability will result in managers attempting to use all available information, common and unique, in preparing their performance evaluations. Thus, we predict the following alternative form hypothesis:
H1:
Managers who are only required to justify their performance evaluation judgments will be more likely to use unique performance measures in their performance evaluation judgments than managers who are not so required.
External data-related debiasing approach
Assurance reports are posited to enhance the reliability of the data in the realm of financial statement reporting; hence, they are valuable in decision-making (Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Libby 1979; Blackwell, Noland and Winters 1998) . Kennedy (1995) suggests that external data-related biases might be remedied by, among other mechanisms, "clarifying and restating existing data, or eliminating irrelevant data" (p.
251). This research implies an assurance report that clarifies the data are reliable and reports that all the data are relevant to the judgment can potentially serve as a debiasing mechanism. Specifically, in the BSC context, providing third party assurance about the reliability and relevance of all the performance measures included in the scorecard could provide enhancements in perceived external data quality (i.e., the report clarifies the reliability of the reported measures and makes it clear the measures are relevant), which could increase the likelihood of managerial usage. 11 We suggest that if the common assuming that all BSC performance measures are chosen on the basis that they are relevant to the strategic objectives of a division. The relevance of the measures used in this study to the performance evaluation judgments is supported by both LS (2000) and the Krumwiede et al. (2002) expert panel assessments. 11 The assurance report covers all performance measures (not just the unique measures) based on our discussions with practitioners who indicated they would not undertake an engagement that was limited to just the unique measures. This position is analogous to the argument in audits of financial statements that one cannot certify only individual parts of the financial statements (CICA HB 5510.26). Based on this analogy, practitioners argued that it would be very difficult for them to associate themselves with only the measures bias is external data-related, the assurance report may be especially important for the unique measures that, by definition, are division specific and therefore possibly viewed as less reliable and relevant compared to the common measures that appear in each division's BSC. 12 This is consistent with theories that posit a threshold level of concept activation, but once this threshold is reached, the information is fully utilized (Grainger and Jacobs 1994; McClelland and Rumelhart 1981) .
This discussion leads to the following hypothesis about assurance alone enhancing the use of the unique measures in accordance with the theory discussed above:
H2: Managers receiving only third party assurance about the relevance and reliability of the BSC performance measures will be more likely to use unique performance measures in their performance evaluation judgments than managers not receiving such assurance.
Combination of effort-related and external data-related debiasing approaches
Our adapted framework gives us no a priori indication whether the common measures bias is effort-related or external data-related. Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) , in an attempt to debias their participants, use both effort-related and internal data-related debiasing techniques in combination, but this did not reduce the common measures bias.
Based on this finding, it could be the case that effort-related and external data-related approaches in combination in our experiment might have the same predicted outcome;
that is, no effect on the bias.
unique measures on an organization's BSC. Thus, by having our assurance report on all measures, not just the unique ones, we increase the mundane realism of our experimental setting, although we may therefore bias against finding the posited effect in H2. Kennedy (1995) uses an effort-related debiaser (a strong process accountability manipulation) and two different internal data-related debiasers (different experiences and the instructed use of counter explanation) in her attempts to debias the curse of knowledge. She found no effect for accountability or experience type (either alone or in combination), but she did find an effect for counter explanation alone in reducing the curse of knowledge bias. Her research demonstrates the importance of examining potential debiasers both alone and in combination. Combining debiasing techniques was also problematic for Ashton (1990) . Specifically, when Ashton (1990) combined feedback (internal data-related), justification and incentives (both effort-related)
simultaneously, he obtained a result that was more biased than using any of the individual approaches by themselves.
Overall, prior research on the combination of different debiasing approaches does not lead to clear predictions. Hence, similar to Kennedy's experiment 3 (1995), H1 and H2 above examine process accountability alone, and the provision of an assurance report alone, as means of increasing the use of unique performance measures. It is, however, theoretically possible that both low processing effort and low perceived data quality contribute to the bias; hence both process accountability and assurance about the relevance and reliability of the data may be necessary to obtain a reduction in the common measures bias. This possibility suggests that invoking more processing effort by establishing process accountability will result in managers using the unique performance measures only when they are also provided with an assurance report establishing that all measures are reliable and relevant to their evaluations. In the absence of such an assurance report, the efficacy of the effort-inducing approach may be negligible. Slovic and MacPhillamy's (1974) results and Ashton's (1990) results would suggest that, at best, we could expect the combined debiasers to result in no effect on the utilization of unique measures and at worst, the combined approach could result in the judgment being the most biased. However, following Kennedy's experiments 1 and 2 (1995), we think it is important to at least examine the joint provision of debiasers as they could occur together in practice. Since there is no strong theory to support a prediction about the joint debiasing effects of process accountability and assurance, we pose the following research question:
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Research question: Are managers who are required to justify their performance evaluation judgments and who also receive assurance about the relevance and reliability of the BSC performance measures more likely to utilize the unique performance measures in their performance evaluation judgments than managers who are neither required to justify their performance evaluation judgments nor receive relevance and reliability assurance?
IV. METHOD Experimental Task
We used the experimental case developed by LS (2000) . The case requires participants to assume the role of a senior executive at WCS Incorporated, a women's apparel company. The case indicates WCS has recently implemented the BSC and describes key features of the approach. The two largest WCS business units are 13 We did not feel comfortable a priori making a "no effects" (Slovic and MacPhillamy 1974) or "most biased" (Ashton 1990 ) prediction as to the best of our knowledge a combination of external data-related and effort-related debiasers has not been previously employed in the literature. Recall that Ashton (1990) , Kennedy (1995) and Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) all employed a combination of an internal datarelated approach and an effort-related approach.
highlighted in the case: RadWear, a retail division that focuses on clothing for urban teenagers; and WorkWear, a division selling business uniforms using a network of sales contacts with business clients. The case provides information about each division, its management, and describes the strategic objectives of RadWear and WorkWear. A BSC is presented for each division containing performance measures stated to be relevant to the strategic objectives described in the case. In their role as WCS executives, participants separately evaluated the performance of RadWear's manager and WorkWear's manager.
We used the same 4-category, 16-measure balanced scorecards developed by LS (2000). Each category on the divisional scorecard contained two measures common to both divisions and two measures unique to each division. On every measure, each division outperformed its target, however, the percentage by which the target was exceeded differed in the two divisions by type of performance measure (common versus unique). RadWear (WorkWear) exceeded its target performance on common (unique) measures to a greater degree than WorkWear (RadWear). However, the sum of excess performance (i.e., total percentage above target) across all measures (common and unique) was almost identical in each division. 14 For more details about the case see LS (2000, (288) (289) (290) .
Design and Procedures
LS ( The setting where common measures favor one division and unique measures favor the other is also interesting from a practice perspective. Specifically, if the evaluator ignores the unique measures, the evaluator will judge the manager who performs well on the common measures to be the better performing manager. This would be contrary to the principle enunciated by the BSC proponents that unique measures reflect what a division needs to do to succeed in its market and hence should not be ignored Norton 1992, 2001) . (2000) data show that in this condition, the difference between the evaluations of the two divisions was 7.12 (reliably greater than zero at the p < 0.001 level). Other research has found the bias to be of similar size in the various replications of LS (2000) noted above.
Our design is a 2 X 2 X 2 between-subjects design with one within-subjects factor. The first between-subjects factor is the requirement that participants justify their evaluation of each divisional manager's performance. This manipulation is intended to induce process accountability among the participants causing them to use additional effort in processing the BSC measures. The case materials for one-half of the participants indicate that upon completion of their numerical performance evaluations they will be "asked to explain and justify in writing how you arrived at your decision . . . . The
President of WCS will review the initial evaluations of the managers' performance so it is important to be careful and precise in completing the evaluations."
15
The second between-subjects factor is the provision of a third party assurance report. The cases for one-half of the participants explain that WCS top management engaged ABC Chartered Accountants to provide assurance on the relevance of the scorecard measures and the reliability of the reported results for each division. ABC's assurance report immediately preceded the scorecard results for RadWear and WorkWear in the case materials. The form and content of the report, shown in Table 2 , was jointly 15 Alerting participants to the justification requirement after performing their evaluations would have lead to self-justification of the decisions already made (Lerner and Tetlock 1999) . Self-justification would be ineffective as a debiasing approach since it does not address the need to increase processing of the unique performance measures prior to making evaluation decisions.
developed with an acknowledged Canadian expert on assurance reports (Section 5025 of the CICA handbook) and other members of the assurance services area of the CICA.
Insert Table 2 about here The within subjects factor, consistent with the design used by LS (2000), is that participants evaluated both divisional managers. We do not vary order of division presentation or manager evaluation as LS (2000) find that order effects have no impact on the experimental variables of interest.
Control variables
As noted in our discussion of Kennedy's framework, judgments may be biased by the decision maker's internal data (knowledge stored in memory) which is not suited for the task they are performing. It is possible that the internal data that develops from work experience or academic study allows managers to develop internal data representations that allow them to process both the common and unique BSC measures. However, LS Jackson 1992). Based on these findings, we elicit our participants' type of work experience, the length of such experience, and their academic background and current emphasis of study, recognizing that each may be a somewhat crude proxy for knowledge.
Although participants are randomly assigned to experimental conditions, we cannot randomly assign experience and academic background to participants. Hence, these are measured control variables entered as covariates in our statistical analyses. However, as noted in LS (2000), attempting to specify what combination of knowledge and experience would make one "expert" at this task is problematic and we acknowledge that this part of our analysis is strictly exploratory.
Our hypotheses predict the debiasing approaches will increase participants' ability to focus on the information provided by the unique performance measures and consequently reduce the degree to which participants' performance evaluations are comparative in nature (Hsee 1996) . Equity theory, however, suggests that managers placed in the decision context employed by LS (2000) will attempt to make comparisons because of concerns for fairness in the evaluation process. According to equity theory, fairness will be judged by comparing the quantity and quality of one divisional manager's inputs and outcomes relative to the inputs and outcomes of the other manager (Adams 1965) . Common measures are obvious candidates for use in dealing with such fairness concerns as they are readily comparable across managers. Hence, we elicit the degree to which participants believe that fairness is important to their performance evaluations to control for individual differences in concern for fairness (e.g., Leventhal, Karuza and Fry 1980; Folger and Cropanzano 1998) . We assess participants' concerns about fairness in the last question in our debriefing instrument. Specifically, we ask them to respond to the statement "To provide a fair performance evaluation for each manager, it was necessary to compare the performance of RadWear to WorkWear." Responses were measured on an eleven-point scale with endpoints of "Strongly disagree" (-5) and "Strongly Agree" (+5).
Dependent Variable
Participants' evaluated the performance of both RadWear's and WorkWear's managers on a scale from 0 to 100 that had seven descriptive labels ranging from "Reassign" to "Excellent" performance. 16 Each of the descriptive labels was explained on the evaluation form. We employed the differences in our participants' evaluations of the two divisions as our dependent variable. 17 Our objective is to assess whether each of the approaches studied will increase participants' use of the unique measures in evaluating the divisional managers' performance.
Participants
Our sample collection plan was based on: (1) a conservative estimate that our debiasing techniques would decrease the average common measures bias by 3 to 4 points (i.e., a 45%-55% reduction in the bias documented by LS (2000) (Cohen 1988; Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985) . Descriptive statistics about the experiment participants are shown in Table 3 .
Participants' average work experience was 5.8 years, 66.5% were male, 21% reported having accounting and/or finance-related work experience and 44% indicated accounting and/or finance as their area of academic emphasis.
Insert Table 3 about here
V. RESULTS

Manipulation checks
A manipulation check shows the participants recognize that the two divisions employ different performance measures (p < 0.001). Further manipulation checks show that participants agree the two divisions sell to different markets (p < 0.001) and they believe it is appropriate for the divisions to employ different performance measures (p < 0.001). In addition, there are no differences across experimental treatments in ease of understanding, case difficulty and case realism (all p > 0.50). Furthermore, as expected, those participants who receive an assurance report believe all the performance measures are more relevant and reliable than those who do not receive such a report (p < 0.001).
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18 Over 90% of the participants answered a recall question correctly about whether they were required to write a justification for their performance evaluations. Over 80% correctly recalled receiving an assurance report. We include all participants in our analysis because the inability to recall whether the assurance report was present or a justification was required does not affect the fact that they were manipulated. Eliminating those participants that had incorrect recalls results in a similar pattern of the adjusted means as those reported in the text.
There were also no difference due to university affiliation nor did differences in university affiliation interact with any of the variables of interest.
The cell means, unadjusted for control variables, are presented in Table 4 (2000) data for this condition of 7.12 (p > 0.50 using both parametric and nonparametric statistics).
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Insert Table 4 about here
Tests of H1, H2 and exploration of research question
We use pairwise a priori planned contrasts to test our first two hypotheses and to explore our research question in the context of an ANCOVA. The mean differences adjusted for significant covariates employed in the ANCOVA appear in Panel A of Table   5 . Panel B of Table 5 reports the ANCOVA results. The ANCOVA results indicate a statistically significant interaction of the assurance report and the requirement to justify, a significant main effect for the fairness control variable, and a significant main effect for one form of work experience, accounting and finance work experience versus all other work experience. No other interactions among the variables are significant, and none of 19 In carrying out our statistical analysis of the base condition, we found four outliers among our 56 participants in that condition. These participants seem to be subject to a pronounced unique measures bias as their average score was -13.25 (i.e., WorkWear evaluation exceeded RadWear evaluation). Inclusion of these participants weakens, but does not change the inferences that are drawn from our statistical tests.
the other potential knowledge proxies and work experience variables approached significance.
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The form of the significant interaction between the provision of an assurance report and the requirement to justify is illustrated in Figure 1 . When neither potential debiaser is employed, the common measures bias is replicated as seen by the magnitude of the difference in divisional evaluations illustrated in the upper left-hand quadrant of Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows that all three conditions involving the potential debiasers exhibit a smaller difference in managerial performance evaluations between the two divisions. Hence, the form of the interaction is consistent with our expectation that the debiasers would decrease the common measures bias.
Insert Figure 1 about here Based on our ANCOVA analysis and our examination of Figure 1 , we use our planned contrasts in Table 5 Panel C to test the simple effects predicted in H1 and H2. 21 We find that, consistent with H1, managers who are required to justify their performance evaluations to a superior are significantly more likely (one-tailed, p < .05) to base their evaluations on unique measures. This increased usage is demonstrated by the reduction (from 6.27 to 1.92 using adjusted mean differences) in the difference in the evaluations of the two divisions. We also find that, consistent with H2, managers who receive an assurance report are significantly more likely (one-tailed, p < .05) to base their evaluations on unique measures. Again this usage is demonstrated by the reduction (from 6.27 to 2.02 using adjusted mean differences) in the difference in the evaluations of the two divisions. Further, in both of the debiased conditions, adjusted mean differences are not significantly different from zero (p > 0.10) indicating that, statistically, there is no common measures bias in these conditions. This is in contrast with the base (i.e., no debiasers) condition where the adjusted mean difference (p < 0.001) is a statistically significantly different from zero.
Insert Table 5 Table   5 .
Overall, the evidence on the combined condition employing both effort-related and external data-related debiasers is somewhat ambiguous. It is relatively clear that the debiasing combination is not as effective as the individual debiasers. Thus, we find results that are consistent with Slovic and MacPhillamy's (1974) combined effort-related and internal data-related debiasing approach where no statistically significant increase in the use of the unique measures is found.
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22 Recall however that Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) find that unique measures were used, but at a much lower weight than the common measures.
Further analysis of the research question
To provide some insight into why the assurance report in combination with the justification requirement was not as effective in debiasing judgment as each treatment alone, we re-analyzed responses to the manipulation check question about assurance (i.e., "The BSC measures are relevant and reliable"). We find a statistically significant interaction between the justification and assurance conditions (p < 0.01) with our relevance/ reliability measure. Specifically, participants considered the BSC measures to be highly relevant and reliable only when the receipt of the assurance report was not combined with a justification requirement. In the assurance report only condition, the reported mean for the BSC measures' relevance and reliability is significantly greater than in the other three conditions, and significantly greater than zero, the scale's neutral mid-point (all p's < 0.05). In the other conditions, there is no reliable difference among the reported means for the BSC measures' relevance and reliability (all p's > 0.10) and the three means are not significantly different from zero, the scale's neutral mid-point (all p's > 0.10).
Next, we compared the contents of the justification memos provided by the participants in the justification only condition to those in the combined condition. 23 We find that participants in the justification only condition documented that they employed all performance measures in making their evaluations significantly more often (p = .05) than those participants in the combined condition.
23 Two independent coders who were blind as to the participant treatment condition and the hypotheses under study coded the justification memos. The two coders met and reconciled by consensus any differences in their codings.
Overall these additional analyses indicate that the combined debiasing condition does not significantly enhance the perceived relevance and reliability of all of the performance measures and leads to less emphasis on using all measures when justifying the managers' performance evaluation. Thus, our results suggest that like prior research (Slovic and MacPhillamy 1974; Ashton 1990 ), combining debiasing techniques does not necessarily lead to participants being debiased.
A supplemental experiment to examine other explanations for findings
LS (2000) report that all of their measures were considered equally relevant to the evaluation of managerial performance in their manipulation checks (292). Krumwiede et al. (2002) replicated that manipulation check with a panel of 24 academics and experienced performance evaluators and found the same result -relevance was judged the same for the common and unique measures. Hence, these findings imply that the assurance report need only provide assurance over the reliability of all the measures, not their relevance. Note that assurance over information reliability is probably the most common form of assurance in practice as this is what the audit of financial statements provides (e.g., Arens et al. 2003) , despite the efforts of many leading public accountants to expand the assurance function to relevance reporting (e.g. Elliott 1997).
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To investigate whether the assurance provided about reliability drove our results, we replicated our assurance only condition and the base (no debiasing) condition with 54
MBA students with backgrounds similar to those used in the main experiment. The only difference from the main experiment's analogous conditions is that we took all references 24 Indeed this is an aspect of our experiment where we had extensive discussions with our assurance services experts as they questioned whether providing relevance assurance was something a practitioner would be willing to do in the near future.
to "relevance of performance measures" out of the assurance report and the case text.
Power is low (about 0.45 at α = .05) given sample sizes of 28 and 26 respectively for the assurance and base conditions. Nonetheless, we found the same directional results as in the main experiment; that is, a decrease of 3.1 in the common measures bias (marginally significant p < 0.08). Furthermore, when we asked about the measures' perceived reliability, we find that there is a significantly greater belief that all the measures are more reliable in the assurance condition than in the base condition (p < 0.04). Therefore, it appears that it is the more traditional audit-related reliability assurance that matters in increasing the use of unique measures in managers' performance evaluation judgments.
It is also possible that the provision of an assurance report over all measures signaled to the participants that management was more committed to the BSC in the assurance condition than in the base condition. We asked our supplemental experiment participants their perceptions of senior management's commitment to the BSC. We found no significant differences between the two groups regarding their perception of managerial commitment to use of the BSC (p > 0.30).
Finally, Kahneman and Tversky (1996) suggest that a within-subjects test for judgment inconsistency gives participants "a chance to detect and correct unintended errors and inconsistencies in responses to different items." (Tan et al. 2002, p. 240) . Kahneman and Tversky (1996) call this a test for cognitive illusion. Therefore we attempt to assess whether the common measures bias is a cognitive illusion. After the 26 supplemental MBA participants in the base condition completed their performance evaluations, we drew their attention to the pattern of common and unique measures that indicated better performance for different managers: common favoring one division and unique favoring the other division (see Table 6 for the question posed). We asked if the participants wished to change their performance evaluations based on this additional information. Of the 24 subjects who answered the question, 17 indicated that they would make no change in their evaluations and 7 said they would evaluate the managers equally. 25 Hence, it does not appear that ignoring the unique information is a question of judgment inconsistency that can be readily remedied by drawing the participants' attention to the information pattern. This evidence suggests that the common measures bias is not a cognitive illusion (Tan et al. 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1996) .
VI. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our experimental design has limitations. First, our experimental participants were not involved in the design of the units' scorecards. Possibly, participants would have gained a better appreciation for the measures if they were involved in their selection, but it is impossible for all managers to be involved in the selection of measures in actual organizations. Second, our participants were likely novices in the use of the BSC, although many had been introduced to Kaplan and Norton (1992) . In addition, they did not necessarily have business experience in the retail and apparel sector from which we developed our case materials, although they did have significant business experience.
Addressing the novice issue, Dilla and Steinbart (2002) unique measures. They find, however, the common measures effect is approximately four times the size of the unique measures effect.
Third, our experiment took place in a one period environment. If our participants had multiple periods to obtain familiarity with the BSC's measures, results might differ (Krumwiede et al. 2002) . In practice, however, the BSC measures may be changed on a regular basis due to changes in strategy or, more likely, the availability/development of new and "better" measures (e.g., Malina and Selto 2001; Malina 2001) . 26 Furthermore, in most organizations, managers change positions regularly and new managers will take time to learn the relations implicit in a BSC. Accordingly, our single period experimental approach might be as realistic as observing participants with multiple periods of experimental experience with the same BSC measures.
Fourth, it is possible that the common measures bias could be caused by managers differentially and systematically weighting a particular common measure or measures (e.g. return on sales, customer satisfaction) as relatively more important in assessing a divisional manager's performance. A manager that uses all measures in his/her evaluations and considers them all to be relevant and reliable, but follows this differential weighting strategy, could produce performance evaluations that exhibit the common measures bias. However, why managers would consistently have a similar differential weighting strategy placing emphasis on common measures is unclear, but it is a necessary condition for the common measures bias to occur across a set of managers. Even if managers did follow a similar differential weighting strategy, the provision of an assurance report would be an ineffective debiaser since it provides assurance to managers 26 Maines et al. (2002) cite a report that one of the original Kaplan and Norton (1996a) companies, CIGNA Property and Casualty, changed the measures on their BSC for six straight years.
that all of their chosen measures are reliable. This type of report is therefore unlikely to affect the weighting of individual measures or groups of measures.
We believe our process accountability approach would also have been an ineffective debiaser if differential weighting was the cause of the bias. Since the differential weighting of both common and unique measures is a cognitively effortful strategy, managers making this effort would likely believe they had made accurate performance evaluations. Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) argue that "performance evaluations will tend to be more careful and less biased as the costs of making inaccurate appraisals increase" (p. 607). Process accountability via review of the manager's performance evaluations by their superior, should raise the cost of inaccurate appraisals.
Hence, process accountability should reinforce, not alleviate, managers' use of a differential weighting strategy since this represents what they believe is the most accurate approach to evaluating the divisions. If they did not believe this was a more accurate approach, it is unclear why they would engage in the more effortful processing necessary to construct these differential weightings in the first place.
This study contributes to the literature by examining ways of increasing the information set managers' use to evaluate divisional performance by incorporating both common and unique BSC performance measures into their evaluations. We find that either provision of an assurance report or invoking process accountability via the requirement to justify their evaluations causes managers to increase the use of unique measures in their judgments. Of course, the relevance of these findings to practicing managers is dependent on whether they view increasing the use of all measures on the BSC in performance evaluations as important. Nonetheless, this research provides the first evidence that an assurance report over the reliability of BSC measures is useful in managerial decision making which, until this study, was an open research question (Maines et al. 2002, p. 359) .
From a theoretical perspective, our finding is intriguing as this is the first examination of an effort-related debiaser and an external data-related debiaser on the same task. Somewhat surprisingly, both are found to be effective debiasers when used alone. This suggests that the bias sources postulated in our adapted framework either are not from mutually exclusive sources (i.e., motivational versus cognitive) or that the BSCbased evaluation task is one in which greater effort and the perception of better quality data can compensate for one another. This latter suggestion is called into question given the results of our combined debiasing condition, which appears to be the weakest of the three approaches. Thus, while our adapted theoretical framework enabled us to determine principled ways to increase the usage of unique measures, only further research will determine the ultimate ability of this framework to guide the selection of appropriate debiasers. A similar conclusion is suggested by Kennedy's (1995) finding that her first two debiasing approaches selected based on her framework were not effective debiasers either alone or in combination.
Overall, we replicate the common measures bias documented by LS (2000) and show that increasing managerial use of unique measures is facilitated by either invoking process accountability via the requirement for managers to justify their evaluations to superiors or the provision of an assurance report over all measures' relevance and reliability. Both interventions are possible in managerial practice, although their actual implementation will depend on organizational circumstances and cost benefit tradeoffs. 
Auditor's Report
To the Management of WCS Inc.:
We have audited WCS Inc's disclosure of its Balanced Scorecard Targets and Actuals for each of its divisions, and the reliability and relevance of the financial and non-financial performance measures presented for each division, for the year ended December 31, 2000. The determination of the measures to include in each division's scorecard report, and the completeness and accuracy of the reported results are the responsibility of WCS Inc.'s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion, based on our audit, of the conformity of the performance measures with the relevance and reliability criteria of the International Performance Measures Reporting Initiative.
Our audit was performed in accordance with standards for assurance engagements established by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our audit to obtain reasonable assurance as a basis for our opinion. Our audit included (1) obtaining an understanding of the strategic objectives and goals of WCS Inc. and each of its divisions, (2) assessing whether the selected performance measures relate to the chosen strategy for each division, (3) assessing the procedures used to produce the reported results, (4) selectively testing the reported results and (5) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, in all material respects, the financial and non-financial performance measures included the Balanced Scorecard Targets and Actuals for each of the divisions of WCS Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2000, are relevant, and reliable in accordance with the criteria of the International Performance Measures Reporting Initiative.
ABC Chartered Accountants
March 31, 2001 a The cell means were calculated using the regression approach (Neter et al. 1985) to estimate values for the dependent variable (RadWear -WorkWear) controlling for differences in participants' work experience (accounting and finance versus all other) and their perceptions of fairness. Analysis shows the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes for the control variables is satisfied. b Probabilities are calculated using one-tailed tests. c Definitions of variables included in the ANCOVA: Assure -assurance report on relevance and reliability of BSC measures and results (provided, not provided); Justify -written justification of performance evaluations (required, not required); Work experience -accounting/finance, other/none; Fairnessparticipants' level of agreement with statement "to provide a fair performance evaluation for each manager, it was necessary to compare the performance of RadWear to WorkWear" (11-point scale). d ANCOVA tests showed no other higher order interactions among the variables are significant.
TABLE 6 Question for Test of Cognitive Illusion
Since this is the first year that you have employed the balanced scorecard to evaluate division managers, you decide to discuss the divisional results with your controller, a chartered accountant (CA) with several years of experience in WCS. The controller comments there is a pattern to the divisional results: First, both divisions did better than target on all measures. Second, for the measures that are the same across the two divisions RadWear shows much better performance, relative to targets, than WorkWear. Third, for the measures that are different across the two divisions WorkWear shows much better performance, relative to targets, than RadWear.
How, if at all, would these comments affect your performance evaluations of the two divisional managers?
Make the evaluations of RadWear's manager and WorkWear's manager the same (equal)
Make no changes to either manager's evaluation
